Urim and Thummim: Prophecies of the Oracle

Urim and Thummim: Prophesies of the Oracle

            Was the “Urim and Tumim” extant during the period of the Second Holy Temple? Maimonides writes^[1] that the Urim and Tumim existed in the Second Holy Temple, but because the Holy Spirit of HaShem did not exist within them, they did not possess the powers to answer questions prophetically. In order for one to receive a message through the Urim and Tumim, one must possess Ruach HaKodesh (divine intuition) ^[2], which during that time period, no one had possessed. Therefore, although present in the Second Holy Temple, the Urim and Tumim did not perform their intended function. Maimonides proves^[3] that they existed in the time of the Second Holy Temple because had they not existed, then the Kohen Gadol (High Priest) would have never been considered fully clothed because the Urim and Tumim are halachikly considered part of the eight holy vestments, which the High Priest must wear while performing the services in the Holy Temple. In providing this as evidence to the Urim and Tumim’s existence during the period of the Second Temple, Maimonides assumes that the Urim and Tumim are indeed considered part of the eight holy vestments of the Kohen Gadol; however, the Ra`avad, Rabbi Avrohom ben Dovid (1125-1198), disagrees^[4] with Maimonides’ view. The Raavad wrote that the Urim and Tumim were not essential components in the Kohen Gadol's holy garments. Therefore, according to the Raavad, since because their absence does not disqualify the Kohen Gadol from performing the sacrificial services in the Holy Temple, it is possible that they did not exist at all in the times of the Second Holy Temple.

The Talmud records a list^[5] of five elements which existed in the First Holy Temple, but were absent from the Second. In this list, the Talmud enumerates both the “Urim and Tumim” and Ruach HaKodesh. The Raavad cites this list to question Maimonides’ assertion that the Urim and Tumim existed in the Second Holy Temple, for the list clearly indicates that the the Urim and Tumim did not exist in the Second Temple. Theoretically, one can answer that Maimonides understood that when the Talmud wrote that the Urim and Tumim did not exist in the Second Temple, the Talmud meant that they did not perform their intended functions, as Maimonides had already mentioned. However, the Raavad preempts such an answer and notes that the Talmud lists the lack of Urim and Tumim separately from Ruach HaKodesh. Had the Talmud merely meant to say that the Urim and Tumim did not function during the Second Temple, that effect would have been achieved by simplying mentioned that Ruach HaKodesh did not exist then because it was the absence of Ruach HaKodesh, which caused to Urim and Tumim to not work^[6].

            Rabbi Yosef Karo (1488-1575) explains^[7] the root of this dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad. He explains that the Raavad maintains that the term “Urim and Tumim” refer specifically to the parchment which contains a special name of HaShem. This parchment was slipped into the folds of the Choshen (breastplate) and worn by the Kohen Gadol. However, Maimonides maintains that “Urim and Tumim” refers to the Choshen itself when it was used for divination[8]. Therefore, Maimonides ruled that the Urim and Tumim were essential to the Kohanic garb, while the Raavad did not. The Lechem Yehuda, in clarifying Rabbi Karo’s explanation, writes^[9] that according to Maimonides, the term "Urim and Tumim" does not necessarily refer to the actual Choshen, but rather to the stones which adorned it. This is evident from the fact that Rabbi Karo elsewhere[10] attempts to prove Maimonides' stance against the Raavad that the Urim and Tumim existed in the Second Holy Temple from a Talmudic tale that detailed^[11] how the Sages attempted to procure the required gems for the Choshen from a gentile whose father was asleep. Had Rabbi Karo meant literally that the Choshen itself was called “Urim and Tumim”, then he would have not have needed to offer proof to Maimonides' view that the Urim and Tumim existed in the Second Holy Temple, it would have been self- evident. This is because had the term “Urim and Tumim” meant the actual Choshen, then surely they would have existed during the time of the Second Temple because the Choshen is unmistakably one of the eight garments which the Kohen Gadol was required to wear during the services. Rather, proves the Lechem Yehuda, Rabbi Karo must have meant that Maimonides considered “Urim and Tumim” a reference to the precious gems which adorned the golden Choshen[12]. Maimonides understood that these gems are to be considered part of the Choshen itself so their absence disqualifies the Choshen as a holy vestment.[13]

Rashi, in his commentary to the Pentateuch^[14], defines the “Urim and Tumim” as the parchment containing the secret name of HaShem. Following the explanation cited above, Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein (1829-1907) writes^[15] that according to Maimonides the Urim and Tumim were the stones on the breastplate, while the Raavad agrees with Rashi that the Urim and Tumim refer to the parchment containing the secret name of HaShem. Indeed, Rashi, in his commentary to the Talmudic tractate Yoma^[16], understands like the Raavad that the Urim and Tumim were not essential components of the Kohen Gadol's attire^[17]. The view of Maimonides that the Urim and Tumim are essential to the Kohen Gadol’s attire is also the view shared by the Tosafists^[18] and Rashi's own grandson, the Rashbam^[19]. According to Rabbi Yosef Karo, Maimonides holds that the Urim and Tumim are essential to the Kohen Gadol’s dress because they refer to the stones of the breastplate, which are part of the breastplate. However, the Raavad believes that the “Urim and Tumim” refer to the parchment therein so the Urim and Tumim are not considered essential to the clothing of the Kohen Gadol. The difficulty arises in the opinion of the Rashbam. The Rashbam, as previously mentioned, rules like Maimonides that the Urim and Tumim are indispensable to the Priestly garb. Why then does the Rashbam in his commentary to the Pentateuch[20] explain that the “Urim and Tumim” is the parchment with His name inscribed like Rashi and the Raavad? One would have expected the Rashbam to explain that the “Urim and Tumim” is the stones of the Choshen in accordance with Maimonides’ view, as explicated by Rabbi Karo. This difficulty remains yet unanswered.

            The Raavad asks why according to Maimonides the Talmud lists the lack of of the Urim and Tumim and that of Ruach HaKodesh as two separate elements lacking in the Second Holy Temple era, if the former is really an outcome of the latter[21]. The Brisker Rov (Rabbi Yitzchok Zev Soloveitchik of Brisk, 1886-1959) explains^[22] Maimonides’ opinion as follows: The Mishnah records[23] that when the “early prophets died, the Urim and Tumim became null”[24] and the Talmud explains^[25] that the Urim and Tumim ceased to function after the destruction of the First Holy Temple. The death of the “early prophets” mentioned in the Mishnah is explained by the Talmud as meaning to exclude the “later prophets” Hagai, Zechariah, and Malachi. That is, the Urim and Tumim already cease to function before their time. As a result, one can conclude that the Urim and Tumim already stopped working before the cessation of prophecy^[26], [27]. Therefore, it could not have been a direct result of the stoppage of prophecy and the Talmud understandably lists the lack of Urim and Tumim as a separate entry besides the lack of Ruach HaKodesh.

According to this, the Brisker Rov reconciles a seeming difficulty in the wording of Maimonides. Maimonides writes^[28] that during the time of the Second Holy Temple, "the Urim and Tumim did not answer [questions] and they did not ask of the Urim and Tumim because there was no Ruach HaKodesh." Logically, one would have thought to place the fact that they did not ask the Urim and Tumim questions before the fact that the Urim and Tumim did not answer any questions. However, the Brisker Rov explains that the Urim and Tumim stopped working with the destruction of the First Holy Temple, so even had someone asked it a question, the Urim and Tumim would not have supplied an answer. Additionally, when prophecy ceased after the deaths of Hagai, Zechariah, and Malachi, not only would the Urim and Tumim not supply an answer if asked a question, but one needs Ruach HaKodesh to communicate with the Urim and Tumim, so there was no one who was even able to pose it a question[29]. Consequently, the loss of the Urim and Tumim’s operability took place in two steps, which explains Maimonides' phraseology.

           

            Rabbi Meir Simcha HaKohen of Dvinsk (1843-1926) offers^[30] a proof to Maimonides’ view (that the Urim and Tumim were essential to the Kohen Gadol’s Choshen) based on an inference from a scriptural verse. The Torah describes "putting the Urim and Tumim into the Choshen"^[31]. Rabbi Meir Simcha says that this implies that without the Urim and Tumim, the Choshen is viewed as incomplete. Since the Urim and Tumim considered a part of the Choshen, then the Urim and Tumim is a critical component of Kohen Gadol's garments. However, this inference is not necessarily a clear-cut confirmation of Maimonides' stance because Rabbi Yaakov Emden (1697-1776) infers^[32] the exact opposite from that same verse. Rabbi Emden infers that since the verse still refers to the Choshen as the “Choshen” even before it contains the Urim and Tumim, the Urim and Tumim must not be considered essential components of the Choshen (as the Raavad holds). Nonetheless, Rabbi Meir Simcha offers another proof to the position espoused by Maimonides from the Targum who referred to the wearing of the Urim and Tumim, which implies that they are a part of the Priestly apparel worn by the Kohen Gadol^[33].

            Rabbi Usher Weiss^[34] explains the root of the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad. Rabbi Yosef Ben Moshe Babad (1800-1874) writes^[35] that a Holy Ark was not built for the Second Holy Temple because King Josiah had already hid the Luchos (tablets upon which the Decalouge was written that Moses received at Mount Sinai). The Ark of Covenant is only meant to house the Luchos tablets. Therefore, since the Luchos were not extant, there was no need for building an Ark. Rabbi Asher Weiss explains that Maimonides holds that the relationship between the Choshen and the “Urim and Tumim” is analogous to the relationship between the Aron HaKodesh and the Luchos[36]. Just as when there are no Luchos, there is no need for an Ark, so too if there is no Urim and Tumim there should be no Choshen, for its entire purpose is simply to house the Urim and Tumim. Since the Choshen is surely one of the essential eight garments of the Kohen Gadol (without which he may not perform the services in the Temple), then Maimonides had to explain that the Urim and Tumim existed during the period of the Second Holy Temple. However, the Raavad felt that although the Ark served as a mere receptacle for the Luchos, the golden breastplate did not serve as a simply vessel to contain the Urim and Tumim. This is because the Torah calls the Ark, "The Ark of the Covenant^[37]" which implies that the entire purpose of the Ark is to serve as a means of holding the covenant between HaShem and the Jews. The Luchos are the physical representation of this convent. However, the Torah never specifically said that the entire purpose of the Choshen is to house the Urim and Tumim. Therefore, the Choshen is still considered complete even without the Urim and Tumim ^[38].

            Rabbi Meir Simcha HaKohen explains^[39] that the Torah does not use the word tamid, "continuously", in regarding to the wearing of the Choshen,  as it does regarding to wearing the other garments because the Urim and Tumim, a portion of the Choshen, were not used (Maimonides) / did not exist (Raavad) during the period of the Second Holy Temple. He also explains that the Torah says, "It [the Choshen] should be on the heart of Aaron", but does not say that Aaron should carry the Choshen on his heart. Perhaps one can explain this anomaly in accordance with Rabbi Usher Weiss' explanation that the Choshen was analogous to the Holy Ark. The carriers of the Ark did not actually carry the Ark, rather the Ark rather carried them^[40]. Perhaps the same can be true of the Choshen, that is, the Kohen Gadol did not carry the Choshen, rather the Choshen carried itself upon his heart. Rabbi Simcha Meir himself explained that the Choshen is analogous to the Luchos: Until the Luchos’ letters flew up, Moses was miraculously able to hold onto the heavy slab of sapphire. Once the letters ascended towards the Heavens, the weight of the object was too massive and he dropped it^[41]. The same is true concerning the Choshen, as long as the Choshen contained the Urim and Tumim, the Choshen carried itself on the Kohen Gadol's chest, while after the Urim and Tumim ceased to work or were gone, the High Priest had to actually bear the Choshen’s weight while wearing it.

            Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer (1870-1953) writes^[42] that it is possible that the Urim and Tumim did exist in the Second Holy Temple even according to the Raavad. He says that perhaps the parchment was indeed inserted into the Choshen even during the time of the Second Holy Temple, but the Urim and Tumim produced no effect because Ruach HaKodesh did not exist then. The raison d'etre of the Urim and Tumim are to "enlighten" people with HaShem's messages^[43], that is, to serve as a means of communication with Him. Thus, the lack of Ruach HaKodesh during the SecondHoly Temple era rendered the Urim and Tumim useless. The Raavad was merely pointing out that this loss of the Urim and Tumim's ability to fulfill its purpose did not render the High Priest unable to serve in the Holy Temple because of a lack of clothing. This is because there was nothing technically wrong with the physical Urim and Tumim. Rather the spiritual level of the nation was so degenerate that Ruach HaKodesh did not exist, which for practical purposes rendered the Urim and Tumim useless. However, since Ruach HaKodesh could have theoretically returned at any time during the Second Holy Temple period, had the nation's spiritual condition improved, the Urim and Tumim were not considered totally lost. Nonetheless, the Talmud considered the the Urim and Tumim lost during the age of the Second Holy Temple because in practice it did not perform its function.

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[1] Laws of the Beis HaBechirah 4:1 (The same is true according to Tosafos to Yoma 21b)

[2] Yoma 73b

[3] See Maimonides, Laws of the Vessels of the Sanctuary 10:10

[4] Hasagos HaRaavad to Laws of Bais HaBechira 4:1

[5] Yoma 21b

[6] Perhaps one can answer that Maimonides employed a variant text of this Talmudic passage which is consistent with the Midrashic parallel of this Talmudic passage and did not list the Urim V’Tumim as part of the five things which existed in the First Temple but not in the Second Temple (see See Midrash Tanchuma, Parshas Behaaloscha, End of §6).

[7] Kesef Mishnah to Laws of Beis HaBechira 4:1

[8] Abarbanel (Exodus 28:30) cites two reasons as to why in the times of the Second Holy Temple was the Urim V’Tumim not used to answer questions. First, he writes that the existence of Ruach HaKodesh is dependent on the unification of all of Israel, for only then does HaShem grace the nation with His presence. Therefore, since only the tribes of Judah and Benjamin returned from the Babylonian Exile while the rest of the Ten Tribes were lost, Ruach HaKodesh did not exist during the times of the Second Temple, so the Urim V’Tumim did not work. Second, he writes that the original parchment containing the secret name of HaShem—which was written by Moses for use in the Tabernacle—was lost during the mayhem of the destruction of the First Holy Temple,  so the Urim V’Tumim did not exist. These two explanations seemingly correspond to the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad. The first explanation is consistent with Maimonides’ view, while the second reflects the view of the Raavad.

[9] Lechem Yehuda to Laws of Vessels of the Sanctuary 10:10, see also Ma’aseh Rokeach ad loc.

[10] Kesef Misnhnah to Laws of Vessels of the Sanctuary 10:10

[11] Kiddushin 41a

[12] In fact, Maimonides' son, Rabbi Avrohom ben Moshe (1185-1237), himself actually defined (see Pirush Rabbi Avrohom ben HaRambam to the Torah to Exodus 28:30) the “Urim V’Tumim” as the stones set upon the Choshen, in consonance with his father’s view.

[13] Tzror HaMor (Exodus 28:30) writes that the true definition of the Urim V’Tumim is unknown to us and writes that it was either a parchment written with HaShem’s name on it or a special manuscript from HaShem or the stones of the Choshen which contained the Hebrew Alphabet in the context of the names of the Twelve Tribes. Interestingly, some early sources write (Hadar Zekanim and Pirush Rabbeinu Yosef Bechor Shor to Exodus 28:30) that not only were the names of the Twelve Tribes etched into the stones of the Choshen, but also the delineation of the borders of each tribes lot in the Land of Israel was also scratched into each tribe’s gem. See also Kisvei HaSforno (Mossad HaRav Kook, 1982 Letters §12) who differentiates between Urim and Tumim. He also writes there that the Urim V’ Tumim were comparable to the Oracles used in Greek temples. Rabbeinu Hasdai Crescas (1340-1411) writes that beleif in the prophetic properties of the Urim and Tumim is an essential dogma of Judaism (see Kovetz Yeshurun Vol. 10, pg 626).

[14] Rashi to Exodus 28:30. Many other Ashkenazi commentaries also write similar explanations to that of Rashi (see Pirush HaRokeach, Rabbeinu Efrayim, Rabbeinu Yoel, Paneach Raza, and Rikanti in the name of Chochmei Magentza). Nachmanides also writes that the Urim V’Tumim refer to the name of HaShem placed inside the Choshen and proves this because the creation of the Urim V’Tumim was never mentioned amongst the creation of all the other Tabernacle’s components, which required skilled craftsmen. Interestingly, Nachmanides writes that the Urim V’Tumim was only inserted into the Choshen once the Choshen was already being worn upon the chest of the Kohen Gadol. From here, Rabbi Meir Arik (in his glosses to Nachmanides’ commentary on the Torah, printed with the Machon Yerushalayim ed. Of Nachmanides) offers a proof to the Raavad’s stance that the Urim V’Tumim was not essential to Kohen Gadol’s Choshen. He explains that many of the Priestly garments contain Shaatnez, a proscribed mixture of wool and linen. The only reason why a Kohen can legally wear these usually illicit clothes is a halachik principle whereby a positive commandment supercedes a negative commandment. Therefore, the positive commandment for a Kohen to perform the sacrificial services in the Temple supercedes the negative commandment that forbids wearing Shaatnez. However, this principle only applies when one is actually fulfilling the positive commandment. If the Choshen was not considered a viable garment without the inclusion of the Urim V’Tumim then the Kohen Gadol would never be allowed to wear the Choshen without the Urim V’Tumim because the Choshen, which is attached to the Eifod (apron) contains Shaatnez. As a result, since Nachmanides writes that the Kohen Gadol would first adorn himself with the Choshen and only afterwards would insert the Urim V’Tumim, this proves that Nachmanides agreed with the Raavad that the Urim V’Tumim is not essential to the Choshen. However, see Mahari Koorkoos (Laws of Vessels of the Sanctuary 8:10) who proves that according to Maimonides only the belt of the Kohen has a prohibition of Shaatnez, but not the other Kohanic garments.

[15] Aruch HaShulchan HeUsid to Laws of Beis HaMikdash §8:15

[16] Yoma 5b

[17] However, Rabbi Aryeh Leib Ginzburg of Metz (1700-1785) questioned (Gevuras Ari to Yoma 4b) this opinion of Rashi: The Talmud (Yoma 4b-5a) records a dispute between two Amoraic sages, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. The Talmud maintains that all details of the Temple’s inaugural service mentioned in the Torah (in its elaboration of the Tabernacle’s inauguration) are vital requirements to the service during the inaugural period. However, regarding a detail whose fulfillment does not post facto disqualify the Temple’s service in future generations but was mentioned in the Torah concerning the inaugural services, the two sage dispute whether such a detail is considered vital to the inaugural services and would thereby disqualify the services if not heeded to. Initially, the Talmud maintains that this dispute is purely theoretically and does not have any practical outcome. However, Rabbi Ginzburg asks that according to Rashi there is indeed a practical outcome. This is because according to Rashi the Urim V’Tumim are a detail of the Temple’s services which, in normal times, does not disqualify the service in absentia, yet the Urim V’Tumim are mentioned in the Torah’s desciption of the inagural services of the Tabernacle (see Exodus 28:30). From here, Rabbi Ginzburg offered a proof to the view of Maimonides that the Urim V’Tumim is indeed essential, not like the opinion of Rashi and the Raavad. However, the Brisker Rov (Chiddushei Maran HaGriz to Yoma 5b) and Rabbi Elazar Mann Shach (Avi Ezri to Laws of Beis HaBechira 4:1) who propose an alternate understanding to that Talmudic passage other than Rashi’s. Their explanation follows Tosafos Rid to Yoma 5b and according to their explanation, the Talmud in Yoma 5b cannot refer to the Urim V’Tumim and thus one can say like the Raavad that the Urim V’Tumim are not essential to the services. However, Rashi explicitly does not follow this explanation, so it is difficult to reconcile Rashi's own opinion.

[18] Tosafos to Yoma 21b

[19] To Bava Basra 133b

[20] To Exodus 28:30

[21] Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer (cited later) answers this question by explaining that the Talmud did listed them as two because practically speaking they were indeed two losses, even though the cause of both was essentially same. Alternatively, he answers that it is not necessarily true that the ability of the Urim V’Tumim to serve as an oracle for divinely answering question is dependent on Ruach HaKodesh. Rather, he posits, perhaps HaShem could have arranged for the Urim V’Tumim to function with only the parchment containing His secret name, even without Ruach HaKodesh. If so, the lack of Ruach HaKodesh is not necessarily the cause for the ineffectiveness of the Urim V’Tumim, therefore, they could have justifably been listed as two separate concepts.

[22] Chiddushei Maran HaRiz HaLevi to Laws of the Vessels of the Sanctuary 10:10

[23] Sotah 48a

[24] Initially, the Talmud thought that “early prophets” refers to the prophet Samuel and King David who lived before the time of the First Holy Temple. However, the Talmud disproves this notion and concludes that “early prophets” just means in distinction to “later prophets” i.e. Hagai, Zachariah, and Malachi. Tosafos HaRosh (printed in Tosafos HaShalem to Exodus 28:30) ask why King Solomon had to ask Ashmodai, the King of Demons, regarding the whereabouts of the Shamir worm (which was used to cut stones for the construction of the First Holy Temple) as mentioned in the Talmud (Gittin 68a), if King Solomon could have just as easily asked the Urim V’Tumim the same question. Tosafos HaRosh answers that the Urim V’Tumim ceased to work after the death of the “early prophets”, as the Mishnah in Tractate Sotah states. This answer of Tosafos HaRosh is contrary to the Talmud’s conclusion because the Talmud had concluded that the “early prophets” simply means “not the later prophets”, but does not mean that the Urim V’Tumim already stopped working during the times of King David and Samuel.

[25] Sotah 48b

[26] The Brisker Rov assumes that Ruach HaKodesh is the same as prophecy which Maimonides himself says in his Guide to the Perplexed, Chapter 42. However, see Rabbeinu Bachaya (Leviticus 8:8) who argues. Abudraham (prayers to Rosh HaShana) and Radaq (introduction to Psalms) assert that the difference between the books of the Prophets (Neviim) and the Writings (Kesuvim) is that the former were written with prophecy, while the latter were merely divinely inspired by Ruach HaKodesh. This implies a difference between prophecy and Ruach HaKodesh.

[27] In this explanation, the Brisker Rov assumes that even during the time of the Second Holy Temple prophecy still existed until the deaths of Hagai, Zechariah, and Malachi. However, this assumption is not necessarily justified as the commentators discuss exactly when prophecy itself was terminated. Rashi (Yoma 21b) wrote that prophecy ceased from the second year of (the Persian) King Darius II—the year that the Second Holy Temple was built. Rabbi Yaakov Emden explains (Hagahos Ya’avetz to Yoma 21b) that Rashi’s source is a Talmudic passage (Megillah 15a) which states that Hagai, Zechariah, and Malachi prophesied in the second year of the reign of King Darius II. However, Rabbi Emden points out that nowhere does the Talmud mention that then was the last prophecy, it merely mentions that prophecy occurred in that year. Furthermore, he asks that there is Scriptural passage (Zechariah 7:1) that explicitly refers to a vision shown to Zechariah in the fourth year of King Darius' reign, which implies that prophecy continued to exist even beyond the construction of the Second Holy Temple. Malbim (Gayah Chazayon to Zechariah 7:1) explains that indeed prophecy had ended prior to Zechariah’s prophecy, and that his prophecy was the sole instance in which  HaShem spoke to a prophet after the cessation of prophecy. (This explanation has deep implication for the nature of prophecy in contemporary times, and implies that even after HaShem stopped prophecy, He might continue it. However, one could argue that this situation is different because Zecharia was already a prophet from before the cessation of prophecy.) The simplest explanation, which likely the Brisker Rov understood to be Maimonides’ view, is that of the Gerrer Rebbe (Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh Leib Alter, 1847-1905), who wrote (Sfas Emes to Yoma 21b) that prophecy continued in the time of the Second Holy Temple until the deaths of all previous prophets (i.e. Hagai, Zechariah, and Malachi). Thus, between the time of the destruction of the First Holy Temple and the deaths of the trio of prophets, the Urim V’Tumim stopped working, but Ruach HaKodesh had maintained its existence. Mahari Qara (to Malachi 3:22) writes that prophecy stopped during the lifetime of Malachi. Rav Nisson Gaon (in his introduction to the Babylonian Talmud) writes that cessation of propechy occured when the Greek Empire began to rise in influence. Rabbi Dovid Ganz (Tzemah Dovid, Section 1 Year 3442) writes that an error had crept into the print of Rashi and really Rashi should read “fourth year” instead of “second year”. Rabbi Elijah of Vilna explains (Biur HaGra to Seder Olam Rabbah Ch. 30, note 12) that prophecy ceased to exist from the time that the Men of the Great Assembly had nullified the inclination for idolatry (see Yoma 69b).

[28] Laws of Beis HaBechira 4:1

[29] Rabbi Nechemya Kaplan, a grandson-in-law of the Brisker Rov, asks (Erev Shabbos Titzaveh, 5771) for what purpose would questions have been posed to the Urim and Tumim when they would not have been able to answer. If they cannot answer, then why should one ask them questions? He explains that Nachmanides writes (end of Nachmanides additions to Maimonides' Sefer HaMitzvos) that there is a positive commandment for the king and/or Sanhedrin to pose a query to the Urim and Tumim before waging war. Rabbi Kaplan asserts that this commandment applies even when the Urim and Tumim are unable to answer the query. He bases this on the words of Nachmanides who writes (Numbers xxx:xxx) that only the Sotah process relies on miraculous intervention, but all other commndments do not require one to rely on a miracle. The oracle-like capabilities of the Urim and Tumim are not natural, rather they are a divine miracle. Had Nachmanides understood that the commandment to ask the Urim and Tumim before waging war was dependent of the Urim and Tumim's ability to answer, then that commandment would have also been one which is dependant on miracles.

[30] Ohr Somayach to Laws of Beis HaBechirah 4:1q

[31] Leviticus 8:8

[32] Hagahos Ya'avetz to Yoma 21b

[33] See Targum Yonason ben Uziel and Targum Onkelos to Deuteronomy 33:8. Rabbi Meir Simcha’s proof is from the fact that the Targumim refer to “wearing” of the Urim V’Tumim which seems to imply that it is to be considered part of the clothing of the Choshen as opposed to merely a supplement to the Choshen in which case one would not “wear” the Urim V’Tumim, rather, one would merely “carry” it.

[34] Minchas Usher to Bava Basra §60:8

[35] Minchas Chinuch, Commandment #95

[36] I have found that Gersonides (Ralbag to Exodus 28:30) already draws this comparison between the placement of the Urim V’Tumim into the Choshen and the placement of the Luchos into the Ark.

[37] Exodus 30:7, see Rashi there

[38] However, Rabbi Usher Weiss questions whether this explanation can be reconciled with Rashi (to Exodus 28:30) who explained that the breastplate as a whole is referred to as the Choshen Mishpat because of the divination powers of the Urim and Tumim, which can serve as a jury to rule in trial.

[39] Meshech Chochmah to Exodus 28:30

[40] See Sotah 35a

[41] Pesachim 87b

[42] Even HaEzel to Laws of Beis HaBechira 4:1

[43] See Brachos 4a which exegetically expounds that the word “Urim” comes from the word “Ohr”, meaning light.

This essay was published as part of my pamphlet Prophecies of the Oracle and other Torah Essays.

Sin or Die

Essay One: Sin or Die
From the moment that Avraham jumped into the fiery furnace under the command of King Nimrod for resisting idolatry, the Jewish nation inherited a certain character trait. That hereditary characteristic is the drive for one to give up his life in martyrdom to sanctify the holy name of HaShem. Rabbi Chaim Volozhiner (1749-1821) explains[1] that this will is now engrained in all descendants of Abraham and accounts for their willingness to sacrifice their lives for the sake of G-d[2]. However, in Halacha, a person is usually obligated to violate a transgression if human life is at risk. This justifies desecrating the Holy Shabbos in order to save someone's life or eating pork when having a gun stuck to one's head (heaven forbid[3]). When someone's life is at risk, any transgression is considered ones (meaning "accidental" or even "forced") and the transgressor is therefore exempt from punishment. The scriptural source for exempting ones is the verse, which states[4] “…and to the [forced] girl do not do anything”; even though she committed adultery, she is exonerated because she was forced. Nonetheless, there are certain instances in which one must give his or her life up instead of committing a sin; these are called cases of yaharog v'al ya'avor. A Beraisa quoted by the Talmud[5] records that only three cardinal prohibitions supersede a human life; they are, namely, idolatry, murder, and the sexually forbidden relations. Concerning these three grave transgressions, the Talmud teaches that one is obligated to give up his life rather than to commit the transgression.
If one is sick on the fast of Yom Kippur to the extent that if he did not eat, he would, die, then the Torah allows him leeway and this person has an exemption from the fast, and can eat[6]. The same law applies to eating chametz (leavened grain products) on Pesach, when such foods are normally forbidden[7]. (In both cases, it should preferably be done in a way where the person has the least amount of pleasure while utilizing this dispensational leniency.) This is true even though under normal circumstances eating on Yom Kippur is grounds for the strictest of punishments[8]. However, if one had a lethal sickness that could only be cured by having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him, or even by looking at the naked flesh of such a lady, the law is that he should be left to die rather than to commit such an act of licentiousness. The same rule seemingly applies to one with a mortally dangerous addiction to idolatry or murder. The Rambam rules that if one ended up saving himself from a disease through committing one of these three cardinal sins, he still gets his befitting punishment from Bais Din. The person is supposed to allow his or her own self to die rather than to heal through dubious means.
According to various additional sources, there may be more than three of these cardinal sins. An addition to the list comes from the Maharshal (Rabbi Solomon Ben Jechiel Luria, 1510-1574), who rules[9] that one should give up one's life rather than to lie about Torah. Perhaps the logic behind this is because lying about the Torah can be tantamount to idolatry for which one is also obligated to give up his life rather than commit. In modern times, many later day achronim decided certain prohibitions should also be considered yeharog v’al ya’avor: Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986) ruled that an American Jew should rather allow himself to be killed rather than to eat turkey on Thanksgiving. Similarly, the Chazon Ish (Avraham Yeshayah Karelitz, 1878-1953) decreed that the prohibitions for a Jewish girl to join the Israeli Army and of negiah (lit. “Touching,” refers to the rule barring a Jewish male from coming into any physical contact with a non-related Jewish female) supersede life[10]. The Ramban quotes[11] an apocryphal Baraitha in which Rabbi Meir adds to the aforementioned list the prohibition of stealing (and damaging other people's property). Indeed, the Chasam Sofer (Rabbi Moses Schreiber, 1762-1839) codifies[12] this minority opinion of Rabbi Mayer into practical use. A footnote to the Otzar Meforshei HaTalmud [13] proposes[14] that perhaps the rationale of Rabbi Meir is the dictum that stealing any amount, even an iota, is tantamount to murder, as the Talmud records elsewhere in the name of Rabbi Yochanan[15].
Additionally, in his glosses to Kesubos 19a, Rabbi Akiva Eiger of Posen (1761-1837), the father-in-law of the Chasam Sofer, refers the reader to a passage from Tosafos in Sotah: The Talmud teaches[16] that it is better for one to throw one’s self into a fiery pit rather than to embarrass a fellow person (“whiten his face”) in public. Tosafos in Sotah[17] give[18] technical reasons as to why embarrassment is not considered one of the three cardinal sins[19].
The Brisker Rav (Rabbi Yitzchok Zev Soloveitchik, 1886-1959) points out[20] that the question of Tosefos assumes that humiliating others does indeed require the ultimate sacrifice in its avoidance. Indeed, Rabbeinu Yonah of Gerona (circa. 12th century) rules[21] that this prohibition takes precedence over one’s own self-preservation. Perhaps one can again say that embarrassment is tantamount to murder, as Rabbenu Yonah himself seems to say in his commentary to Avos 3:11, and thus was not required to be enumerated in the list of yeharog v’al ya’avor cases. The comparison between embarrassment and murder is traditionally explained by assuming that one loses blood in his face when embarrassed, which is similar to death; this explains the Rabbinical Hebrew term for “embarrassment,” which is “malbin pnei chaveiro,” literally, “whitening the face of his friend.” Nonetheless, the Rambam omits[22] lying about the Torah, embarrassing others, and stealing in his enumeration of the cardinal sins.
The underlying foundation for each accepted cardinal sin is found throughout the Talmudic literature. Every Jew is supposed to love HaShem “with his might”[23]. A Braisa explains[24] that this teaches that a man whose body is overly important to him should give up his body in service to HaShem, if forced to commit idolatry. The reasoning behind why one must give up his life rather than to be forced to murder someone else is based on[25] a logical question, “Why is my blood redder than his [the potential victim’s] blood?” This means that a person cannot assume that his life is more precious than another’s and should another’s life be at stake, he should allow himself to murdered rather than to actively commit murder himself. All of the sexually forbidden relations are exegetically compared[26] to murder based on Deuteronomy 22:26, which considers raping a betrothed girl to soul-murder, and thus one is obligated to give up his life in order not to commit one of those forbidden sexual acts. Some explain that since one cannot have an erection without proper intent to do so[27], any case of the forbidden sexual relations must be considered willing and thus can never be classified as completely ones[28].
Tosafos elucidate[29] at great length the deep intricacies of the laws of yeharog v’al ya’avor. They explain that one is only obligated to sacrifice himself if he would otherwise be committing the transgression actively. However, explain Tosaphos, if either a person would otherwise be committing a transgression indirectly or submissively, he is not obligated to allow himself to be killed. Committing a sin merely causatively—instead of directly—is like one being pushed on top of a baby to kill him as opposed to choking the baby with one’s own hands. Classic examples of passively sinning include two people physically being forced upon each other by another or any female in sexual relations (who is qarqa olam). This explanation justifies the acts of Esther, a married woman according to Megillah 13a, who had an adulterous relation with the Persian-Median king, King Achashverosh[30]. Since as a female she was only a passive partner in the relationship, she was not considered actively transgressing the law and thus was allowed to lie with him instead of allowing herself to be executed. However, the Talmud[31] was not satisfied with this answer because she nonetheless gained some pleasure from her relations[32] with the wicked king and thus should have refrained from that. Tosafos answer that just as the Talmud said by Yael[33] that when a righteous person causes pleasure for a wicked person it is displeasure for the righteous person, with reference to Esther, since she pleasured the evil king Ahasuerus, their relations was displeasure for her. Others answer that sex with a non-Jew does not have the legal status of sex; however, this is a difficult answer. The second understanding answers the problem with the first answer in that since their relationship was on public display, transgressions involved should have had stronger stringencies attached to it.
In the story of Purim, Mordechai HaYehudi refused to prostrate himself in front of Haman the Agagite; he was even willing to give up his life in order not to bow down to Haman[34]. This is because, as the Rambam rules[35], in a situation where one is forced to commit a transgression in public, one must always choose death. Furthermore, at a time of persecution (shmad) or under a regime or influence of anti-Torah forces that purposely cause people to commit sins, any ultimatum given between death and sin should result in death. The Talmud says[36] even though one who is physically forced beyond his control to commit a sin is usually not responsible for his sin; there is no such dispensation for idolatry. Thus, even if one is physically forced to submit to an idol, even if he does not have any heretical intentions when committing the abominable act, he is still liable. These reasons justify Mordechai in not bowing down to Haman even though it could have potentially caused the death of world Jewry[37] in his time. The Rambam says that an important person (e.g. the Gadol HaDor) should not use a leniency and should sacrifice himself. Mordechai put himself in danger by not bowing to Haman because Mordechai, as a member of the Sanhedrin, was one of the leading Rabbis of his generation and it would thus be unfitting to allow himself to commit a sin, especially in public. Mordecai did not have the heter (permission) of being passive (elaborated in Tosafos above) like his wife had, because obeisance in submission to an idol is an active action even if it is being caused by another person. Rabbi Chaim Solveitchik of Brisk (1853-1918), father of the Brisker Rav, assumes[38] that the Rambam did not concur with Tosefot concerning that heter and felt even by a passive one is obligated to give up his life. The Chazon Ish was in doubt whether the Rambam agreed with the heter of Tosafos or not[39]. This can explain why Mordechai did not use the heter[40].
In practical Halacha, Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger (1798-1871) writes[41] that it is forbidden for one to embarrass another in order to save his own life[42]. He writes that although embarrassing another is not actually considered an active action, one is still obligated to give up his life. Perhaps this is because talking (which presumably is the means of embarrassment) can be considered a semi-action in Halacha[43]. Rabbi Ber Oppenheim argues on Rabbi Ettinger[44]; he maintains that the passage in Sotah 11a is merely an Aggadic citation and bears no relevance in practical Halacha[45]. The Brisker Rav[46] points out a discerning feature in the text of the Gemara: It literally states that it is “better for one to throw him into a fiery pit and not embarrass his friend.” This seems to imply that it is only “better” for one to do so, but not that he is obligated to do so.
The Rambam and Tosafos both agree that if a person does not give up his life, but instead allows himself to be forced into a sin, then he cannot be held liable. This is because his transgression was forced (because of the threat of losing his life) and as explained above, the Torah exempts an accident. In an amazing novel idea, the Rambam says that since when one sacrifices his life in order to not sin, he sanctifies the name of heaven (like those who died in the Holocaust), then the converse should also be true and when such a person does the sin, he is profaning the name of G-d (chillul HaShem). A Noachide does not have this obligation to sanctify the “name of heaven”[47], therefore is not considered desecrating the name of G-d by commit these sins instead of allowing himself to be killed. It seems from here that a Noahide is not allowed to risk his life to avoid one of these sins. However, Shifrah and Puah[48] disobeyed the King of Egypt and thereby put their own lives in danger by not committing infanticide on the Jewish baby boys[49]. This seems to imply that a non-Jew is allowed to risk his or her life in order not to commit murder. The Maharitz Chayos (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes, 1805-1855) explains[50] that the two midwives evaluated the situation and concluded that not killing the babies would actually not put their lives in danger, so they helped save the babies. However, under normal circumstances, a Noahide is not permitted to put his life in danger in order not to commit one of the cardinal sins. Doing so is tantamount to stealing from G-d, for one’s body and soul is not his own, but is rather His.
Under normal circumstances, a person committing suicide is forbidden. When Chur, the grandfather of Betzalel, refused to help the Jews build a Calf of Gold for idolatry, he was put to death. This is because “the world in its entirety belongs the Creator”[51], and killing oneself is akin to stealing from Him. Furthermore, under normal circumstances a person may not give up his life in order to perform one of the mitzvos because it says[52], “v’chai bahem,” meaning that one should live through the commandments, decrees, and laws of the Torah, and not that one should, god forbid, die through them. However, given certain criteria, the gravity and seriousness of certain sins have the power to obligate the potential transgressor to give up his life rather than to commit an atrocity. It should be the will of G-d that the merit of those who have died as martyrs in the name of heaven should come and redeem His people from their current situation and bring upon the days of Moshiach, speedily and in our days. Amen.


[1] Ruach Chaim, Avos, Chapter 5
[2] Perhaps this explains the suicidal extremists of Islam – an Abarahamic religion—who feel their actions are the wishes of G-d.
[3] In the interest of brevity, this phrase will be omitted many times in the following paragraphs, even in instances where it should really be present.
[4] Deuteronomy 22:26
[5] Kesubos 19a
[6] Yoma 83a
[7] Exodus 12:20
[8] Kerisos 2a
[9] Yam Shel Shlomo to Bava Kama, 4:9
[10] Perhaps the source of the Chazon Ish is Maimonides, Laws of Foundations of Torah, 5:9 who says that even two single people cannot engage in relations to save one’s life, and the Rabbis even flogged someone (Yevamos 91b), even when the law did not call for it, in order to distance the Jewish people from promiscuity and to maintain the nation’s purity and innocence.
[11] Kesubos 19a
[12] See responsa Chasam Sofer on Choshen Mishpat, §1
[13] Compiled and published by Machon Yerushalayim in the 1990’s
[14] Bava Kama 50b
[15] Bava Kama 119a
[16] Sotah 10b
[17] Attributed to Rabbi Baruch ben Shmuel of Mainz (d. 1221), the author of the Sabbath poem “Baruch Kel Elyon”
[18] Ad loc.
[19] It seems that since the prohibition of embarrassing others is not written explicitly in the Oral Torah, it lacks the magnitude of the three cardinal sins, which were unequivocally written in the Chumash multiple times.
[20] Chiddushei HaGriz to Sotah ad loc.
[21] Sha’arei Teshuvah 3:139
[22] Maimonides, Laws of Foundations of Torah, Chapter 5
[23] Deuteronomy 6:5
[24] Brachos 60b
[25] Yoma 82b
[26] Sanhedrin 74a
[27] See Yevamos 53b. “Rabbi” Bradley Shavit Artson had the audacity to argue with this Talmudic dictum and state that it cannot be true based on stories of “Tzaddikim” who had nocturnal emissions through unintentional erections (Jewish Spectator, Winter 1990, “Gay and Lesbian Jews: An Innovative Jewish Legal Position”). However, he is mistaken because in Halacha erections while asleep are considered ones, not merely unintentional.
[28] Forbidden relations while he is flaccid according to this understanding must be permitted.
[29] Ad loc. and Yoma 82a-b
[30] Albeit she cohabited with him using a contraceptive device, see Tosafos, Megillah 13b.
[31] Sanhedrin 74a
[32] Bava Kama 32a
[33] Yevamos 103b
[34] Esther 3:2-5
[35] Maimonides, Laws of Foundations of the Torah, 5:2
[36] Avodah Zarah 54a
[37] Achashveyrosh ruled the entire world and thus had the authority to instate a worldwide killing of Jews, as proven in Megillah 11a
[38] Chidushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi Al HaRambam, Laws of Foundations of the Torah, 5:1
[39] See Chiddushei HaChazon Ish Al HaRambam, ad loc. and the footnotes of the Chazon Ish on Reb Chaim Brisker, cited above
[40] However, see responsa Chasam Sofer on Yorei Deiah, §133 for a completely different rationalization of Maimonides’s opinions. See also Tosafos to Shabbos 72b concerning Mordechai’s refusal to bow to Haman.
[41] Responsa Binyan Tzion §182 and §183
[42] Based on the passage from Sotah 11a cited above
[43] Specifically regarding false witnesses who receive lashes for their testimony or a blasphemer who verbally curses the Lord
[44] As recorded in the responsa from Rabbi Ettlinger
[45] He bases himself on the Terumas HaDeshen §108.
[46] Chiddushei HaGriz to Sotah 11a
[47] See Sanhedrin 74b. The Bais HaLevi (Parshas Yisro) interestingly explains why non-Jews are not obligated to give up their lives for certain commandments, while Jews are. He says that at Mount Sinai, HaShem acquired the Jews as His slaves and therefore, they are bound by His command to the Torah (yet concerning most commandments, He says one is not obligated to die for, but for others He says one is). Non-Jews are only bound by His commandments as part of humanity, but not in the fashion that a slave must heed to his master/owner. Therefore, gentiles are commanded in their Noahide laws, but are not obligated to sacrifice themselves for them.
[48] Identified as either Yocheved and Miriam, or Jochebed and Elisheva, respectively, see Sotah 11a
[49] Exodus, Chapter 1
[50] Glosses to Sotah 11a
[51] see Psalms 24:1
[52] Leviticus 18:5